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STRIP SEARCHES INCIDENT TO ARREST: 
CABINING THE AUTHORITY TO HUMILIATE 
EUGENE L. SHAPIRO* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the more puzzling characteristics of current Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence has been the inadequacy of judicial evaluation of strip 
searches that are conducted upon the sole justification that they are incident 
to a lawful arrest.  At first glance, the issue may seem to arise infrequently 
in light of an arrestee’s possible incarceration and the well-known latitude 
afforded jail administrators when addressing the special requirements of a 
prison environment.1  But the more-than-occasional case has placed a judi-
cial imprimatur upon the warrantless strip search of an arrestee where no 
mingling with a jail population is imminent or even contemplated.2  With 
one exception, federal circuits have approached the matter as if the Fourth 
Amendment’s preference for warrants is not sufficiently implicated to merit 
discussion and the Amendment’s mandates are fulfilled solely by inquiry 
into the particularized facts possessed by the police. 
Part II of this article will address the prevalent trend, exemplified by 
the recent en banc opinion of the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit 
in Evans v. Stephens,3 and will evaluate the apparent assumptions upon 
which this approach is grounded.  Part III will examine a contrary view held 
by the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.4  Its approach contemplates 
the participation of a magistrate only when a search extends into a body 
cavity, an approach which insufficiently acknowledges the intrusiveness of 
other strip searches.  Part IV will then suggest a more focused approach, 
which most appropriately comports with the Fourth Amendment’s prefer-
ence for warrants, its constitutional standard of reasonableness, and the 
practical realities of arrests. 
 
 *Professor of Law, Cecil C. Humphreys School of Law, The University of Memphis. 
1. In Bell v. Wolfish, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of visual body cavity 
searches of inmates who were examined after contact visits with individuals from outside of the 
institution.  See infra notes 163-67 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Bell). 
2. See infra notes 163-166 and accompanying text. 
3. 407 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
4. See Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1441, 1437 (9th Cir. 1991). 
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Identification of the range of activity that will be included within the 
term “strip search” for purposes of this article is necessary.  At a minimum, 
the term refers to visual examination of the intimate surfaces of the body, 
i.e., the genitals, anus, and female breasts.  Such examination is, however, 
often inseparable from actions of the officer or compelled actions by the 
arrestee which are tied to the process.  Reported accounts are replete with 
often jarring descriptions of the manipulation of the genitals and buttocks 
and other compelled bodily movements.5  Visual examination may also be 
accompanied by the physical penetration of the body, by either the officer 
or the arrestee upon command.6  The degree of intrusion has, of course, 
been important in the assessment of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.  
Moreover, the wide variety of circumstances under which strip searches 
have been undertaken has not been a barrier to the emergence among the 
circuits of a clear trend in their articulation of constitutional standards. 
II. THE PREVALENT TREND 
In several respects, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion in Evans highlighted 
a number of significant and frequent aspects of the prevalent treatment of 
the subject.  Characteristically, while purporting to impose restraints upon 
the police with the articulation of its standards, the court assumed that the 
issue was adequately addressed by its discussion of requirements which 
may be imposed upon permissible warrantless searches of the person.  The 
warrant requirement was not explored.  The allegations before the court 
also reflected the types of issues that might arise concerning potential abuse 
in the area.  Moreover, in the context of a civil rights action and a 
defendant’s claim of qualified immunity, the court addressed the question 
of whether its standard for the initiation of a properly conducted strip search 
of an arrestee was clearly established at the time of the search.  With Evans 
and the other cases discussed in this article, it is important to emphasize that 
the courts recounted and evaluated plaintiffs’ allegations and not proven 
fact. 
 
5. See, e.g., Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1267 (7th Cir. 1983) (invol-
ving a strip search policy that required bending and squatting); Way v. County of Ventura, 445 
F.3d 1157, 1158-59 (9th Cir. 2006) (discussing a policy allegedly requiring an arrestee’s com-
pelled manipulation of genitalia).  See generally M. Margaret McKeown, Strip Searches Are Alive 
and Well in America, 12 HUM. RTS. 37, 38 (1984-1985) (describing strip searches and what they 
entail); John Gibeaut, Marked for Humiliation, 85 A.B.A. J. 46, 46-47 (1999) (discussing claims 
or allegations of strip searches). 
6. See, e.g., Amaechi v. West, 237 F.3d 356, 361 (4th Cir. 2001) (involving an allegation of 
vaginal penetration by an officer); Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 711-12 (9th Cir. 
1989) (involving an allegation of compelled vaginal and anal penetration by arrestee). 
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Peter Evans and Detree Jordan filed an action under 48 U.S.C. § 1983, 
charging that their Fourth Amendment rights were violated by strip 
searches on January 22, 1999.7  They alleged the following, which was 
discussed in the Eleventh Circuit’s en banc opinion8 and assumed by the 
court to be accurate upon its review of the denial of defendant’s motion for 
summary judgment:9 Evans and Jordan were male African-American 
students or former students at Georgia Southern University in Statesboro.10  
They were both in their early and mid-twenties, and while driving a rental 
car at night from Atlanta to Statesboro they became lost and found them-
selves on Interstate 85 instead of Interstate 75.11  Attempting to return to 
that route, Evans drove through the city of Zebulon, Georgia, where the car 
was stopped by a white male officer, Denis Stephens, for driving 72 miles 
per hour in a 45 miles per hour zone.12  The stop was recorded by the 
officer’s video camera, and as Stephens approached the car an officer from 
the City of Concord arrived.13  Officer Stephens, who believed that Evans 
had been driving while intoxicated, ordered him to step out of the car and 
searched his pockets.14  Evans denied committing the offense, and Stephens 
claimed that he found a beer bottle top in a pocket, although he did not 
show it to the recording camera.15  Evans denied the top’s existence.16 
While Evans was at the rear of his car, Officer Stephens obtained 
Jordan’s drivers license and asked him to step out of the vehicle.17  
Stephens then received Evans’ permission to search the vehicle, and did so 
for about five minutes.18  While Officer Stephens stated that he discovered 
 
7. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1277; see Evans v. City of Zebulon, 351 F.3d 485, 487 (11th Cir. 
2003) (panel opinion), vacated, 364 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (involving an action by the 
arrestees in Evans v. Stephens against the City of Zebulon for the same incident).  The action had 
initially alleged the violation of the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as Title VII 
of the 1965 Civil Rights Act, but the claims were narrowed to those based upon the Fourth 
Amendment.  Evans, 407 F.3d at 1277. 
8. See Zebulon, 351 F.3d at 487-89 (providing additional details of Evans and Jordan’s 
accounts). 
9. The court “accept[s] the nonmovant’s version of the events when reviewing a decision on 
summary judgment.” Evans, 407 F.3d at 1278. Consequently, when the opinion cited allegations 
by Evans or Jordan which were contradicted by the defendant officer, the opinion credited the 
plaintiffs’ versions.  Id. 
10. Id. at 1275. 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. Id. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 1275-76. 
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an open container of alcohol, Evans denied the item’s existence.19  Al-
though the officer usually showed such containers to the video camera, he 
did not do so in this instance.20  A third officer from the county sheriff’s 
office had by then joined the group.21 
Officer Stephens charged Evans with speeding, read him the Georgia 
Implied Consent Law, and asked if Evans would consent to a breathalyzer 
test.22  When Evans stated that he wanted to call his lawyer, Officer 
Stephens placed him under arrest.23  Evans repeated the request and re-
ceived the same response.24  Evans was then charged with “D.U.I. refusal” 
and speeding and was placed in the patrol car.25  The court noted that at 
Officer Stephens’ deposition he stated that Evans had “alcohol on his 
breath, bloodshot eyes, and an unstable demeanor.”26  By radio, Officer 
Stephens then requested a check for outstanding warrants against Jordan.27  
The dispatcher replied that an arrest warrant was outstanding against a 
“Detre Jordan” who had Plaintiff Jordan’s date of birth.28  Officer Stephens 
then placed Jordan under arrest, searched his pockets, and said that he 
would release Jordan if the warrant was not for him.29  During the subse-
quent litigation, the parties agreed that the warrant was for someone other 
than Plaintiff Jordan.30  The officers searched the car and surrounding area 
for about seven minutes before a tow truck arrived, and found nothing.31 
Evans and Jordan were driven to the Pike County Jail.32  On the way, 
Jordan continued to protest that the warrant was not for him and requested a 
phone call.33  Both arrestees stated that Officer Stephens said “he is the 
judge and jury in Zebulon and that he decides who can make phone calls.”34  
Evans recalled the officer stating that he would “send you niggers away for 
a long time.”35  The arrestees were patted down before entering the county 
 
19. Id. at 1276. 
20. Id. 
21. Id. at 1276 n.2. 
22. Id. at 1276. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. 
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 1276 n.3. 
31. Id. at 1276. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
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jail building.36  The jailer on duty was informed of the charges, and after 
reviewing the report about the subject of the arrest warrant, he concluded 
that it was not Plaintiff Jordan and encouraged Officer Stephens to release 
him.37 
It was further alleged that Officer Stephens “became angry and walked 
Jordan to a room that appeared to be a supply closet or mop storage 
room.”38  Plaintiffs alleged the following sequence of events: Officer 
Stephens then used “racist language,” and required Jordan to place his 
hands on the wall, and had him remove his shirt and shoes.39  After Jordan 
complied, Officer Stephens ordered him to take off his remaining clothes.40  
When Jordan was asked to remove his underwear, Jordan protested, turned 
and stated that Officer Stephens had the wrong person.41  Jordan stated that 
Officer Stephens then placed him in a chokehold and held Jordan against 
the wall until he began to gag.42  Jordan again faced the wall, and stated that 
Evans was thrown into the room against him, causing them both to fall.43  
Jordan attempted to stand and was hit on his side by Officer Stephens with 
a baton-like, cold, black, cylindrical object.44 
Plaintiffs also alleged that after Evans was in the room, Officer 
Stephens again ordered Jordan to remove his underwear.45  “According to 
Jordan, after Officer Stephens—in Evans’s presence—pulled Jordan’s 
underwear to his ankles, Officer Stephens used the same ‘cold black’ object 
to separate Jordan’s butt cheeks and ‘stuck [it] in [his] anus.’”46  Evans 
testified that Officer Stephens then turned to him, and told Evans “to 
remove his underwear and then—in Jordan’s presence—placed ‘the [same] 
stick in [my] ass.’”47  Evans testified that Stephens then used the same 
baton to lift Evans’ and Jordan’s testicles and did not wipe or clean the 
baton during the search.48 
 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id.  Evans testified that the chokehold occurred later, after Evans was in the room.  Id. at 
1276 n.4. 
43. Id. at 1276. 
44. Id. at 1276-77, 1277 n.5. 
45. Id. at 1277. 
46. Id. 
47. Id. 
48. Id.  See Evans v. City of Zebulon, 351 F.3d 485, 489 n.7 (11th Cir. 2003) (panel 
opinion), vacated, 364 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2004) (providing more details of the plaintiffs’ 
accounts of the incident). 
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Plaintiffs stated that during this period, Stephens “taunted both Plain-
tiffs with laughter, racist language and threats of prison.”49  Plaintiffs also 
stated that after the search, they were required to dress quickly, were 
handcuffed to the bench in front of the jailer, and were then placed with the 
general jail population for the night.50  Officer Stephens denied the arres-
tees’ account, stating that while he asked them to remove their clothing in a 
trustee cell, he did not touch or taunt them.51  Officer Stephens later testi-
fied that the search for drugs was appropriate because “he had reasonable 
suspicion that Plaintiffs had drugs based on their demeanor (nervousness at 
the roadside stop) and their story of being lost,” and he stated that their 
possession of a rental car contributed to his suspicion.52 
The federal district court denied Officer Stephens’ motion for summary 
judgment with respect to the claims that the searches had been conducted 
without reasonable suspicion and in an unconstitutional manner.53  It also 
held that Officer Stephens was not entitled to qualified immunity on either 
claim.54  On appeal, a panel of the Court of Appeals analyzed the searches 
under the standards it perceived to be applicable for arrestees “who are to 
be detained in the general jail population,”55 and found that the alleged 
searches were unconstitutional, both with respect to the basis for their 
initiation and the manner in which they were allegedly conducted.56  Never-
theless, the panel found that Officer Stephens was entitled to qualified 
immunity on both claims, stating that on January 22, 1999, the law was not 
clearly established that “reasonable suspicion was required to conduct a 
strip search or body cavity search of an arrestee detained in the general jail 
population,”57 and there were “no materially similar precedents that 
 
49. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1277.  The earlier panel opinion referenced Jordan’s statement in his 
deposition that Stephens was “saying comments like I am going to send you boys to prison, y’all 
are going to get butt fucked up the ass.  I am going to send y’all up the road for a long time, boy.” 
Zebulon, 351 F.3d at 489 n.8.  Evans testified that Stephens was “saying you better get used to 
this, this is how it is in the big house, this is where you getting ready to go.  Somebody is going to 
be butt fucking you for the next 20 years, all because you got a smart mouth.”  Id. 
50. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1277. 
51. Id. at 1277 n.6. 
52. Id at 1277, 1280. 
53. Id. at 1277.  The district court granted the motion for summary judgment of the other two 
defendants, the City of Zebulon and the Chief of the Zebulon Police Department, and granted 
Stephens’ motion with respect to the claim that there was no probable cause for the arrests.  
Zebulon, 351 F.3d at 489-90. 
54. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1277. 
55. Zebulon, 351 F.3d at 490. 
56. Id. at 490-93. 
57. Id. at 492. 
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provided Stephens fair warning of the unconstitutionality” of the manner in 
which the searches were performed.58 
After vacating the panel’s decision and rehearing the appeal en banc, 
the Eleventh Circuit concluded: 
[O]n reflection, this case provides no opportunity to decide the 
question of when jailers (for security and safety purposes) may 
lawfully conduct strip searches of persons about to become in-
mates in the general jail population.  This case raises no questions 
about the necessities of jail administration.  This case involves a 
different kind of search altogether: a post-arrest investigatory strip 
search by the police looking for evidence (and not weapons).  
Officer Stephens—who was not a jailer—testified (without 
contradiction from others) that he strip-searched Plaintiffs because 
he (as the arresting officer) believed them to be in possession of 
illegal drugs: the search was part of a criminal investigation 
looking for evidence.59 
The court examined plaintiffs’ constitutional claims separately.  First, 
it examined whether the Fourth Amendment required reasonable suspicion 
for the initiation of such a “post-arrest investigatory” strip search.60  Sec-
ondly, it discussed whether the manner of the alleged searches was constitu-
tionally reasonable.61  With regard to the former, the court noted that the 
Supreme Court never explicitly addressed the requirements for such a 
search away from the context of the nation’s borders and jail administra-
tion.62  Succinctly stating that it was balancing “the need for investigative 
strip searches for evidence that might be hidden on the arrestee’s body 
 
58. Id. at 494.  Zebulon observed that Hope v. Pelzer entitled an official to “qualified 
immunity for liability arising out of his discretionary actions unless those actions violated a 
clearly established federal right of which a reasonable person would have known.”  Id. at 490.  
The court recalled Hope had stated that “the salient question . . . is whether the state of the law . . . 
[at the relevant time] gave the . . . [officers] fair warning” that their alleged action was 
unconstitutional.  Id. (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 741).  The panel added that in the Eleventh 
Circuit “[o]nly decisions of the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit, and the highest court of the 
relevant state clearly establish the law for purposes of qualified immunity.”  Id. at 494 n.15.  
Judge Propst dissented on the issue of qualified immunity with respect to the manner in which the 
search was conducted.  Id. at 497-99 (Probst, J., dissenting). 
59. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1279 (internal citations omitted).  The court added that the issue here 
involved such a search “away from the complicated context of the nation’s borders.” Id. 
60. Id. at 1278. 
61. Id. 
62. Id. at 1279.  The court listed several cases which “provide guidance,” briefly discussing 
only Bell v. Wolfish.  Id.  The cases cited were: Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990); Bell v. 
Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800 (1974); United States v. 
Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); and Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).  Id. 
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against the intrusiveness inherent in a strip search,”63 the court concluded 
that Maryland v. Buie64 provided “the analytical framework that, at a 
minimum, would apply to strip searches for evidence.”65  The court 
observed that, in Buie, the Supreme Court had permitted “a post-arrest 
protective sweep search of the arrestee’s house,”66 concluding that 
“searches of property incident to arrest must be justified by ‘articulable 
facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, 
would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing’ the search was 
necessary.”67  The Court of Appeals added: 
Put differently, we are confident that an officer must have at least 
a reasonable suspicion that the strip search is necessary for evi-
dentiary reasons.  Perhaps the actual standard is higher than rea-
sonable suspicion, especially where, as here, the search includes 
touching genitalia and penetrating anuses.  But because Officer 
Stephens—in the light of the supposed facts—did not meet even 
the minimum possible standard of reasonable suspicion, we need 
not decide if the actual standard is something even higher to 
decide whether Officer Stephens failed to comply with the 
Constitution.68 
The court observed that the existence of reasonable suspicion is to be 
measured from the view of a reasonable officer under the totality of the 
circumstances.69  In the instant case, Officer Stephens’ assertion that the 
arrestees’ nervousness, their story about being lost, and their use of a rental 
car did not constitute a sufficient basis for establishing a reasonable suspi-
cion that they possessed drugs.70  The court stated that they had not been 
 
63. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1279. 
64. 494 U.S. 325 (1990). 
65. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1279 (emphasis in original). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. (quoting Buie, 494 U.S. at 334).  In Buie, to protect arresting officers against assaults 
by criminal confederates, the Supreme Court authorized a two-stage sweep of premises incident to 
arrest.  Buie, 494 U.S. at 336-37.  Without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, the area 
immediately adjacent to the place of arrest may be subjected to a brief examination of those places 
“from which an attack could be immediately launched.”  Id. at 334.  The Court continued, “Be-
yond that . . . we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational 
inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area 
to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.”  Id.  In Evans, the 
court noted that Buie had relied upon Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  Evans, 407 F.3d at 1279. 
68. Evans, 407 F.3d at 1279-80 (internal citations omitted).  The court emphasized that this 
standard did not apply to strip searches for other purposes, such as searches of arrestees bound for 
a jail’s general population or a search by officers for weapons which might pose a threat.  Id. at 
1279 n.8. 
69. Id. at 1280. 
70. Id. 
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arrested for drug-related offenses and added that, even if there had been an 
initial suspicion of drugs, “the strength of that suspicion was undermined by 
other events before the strip search got started.”71  The plaintiffs’ car had 
been searched for over ten minutes and the surrounding area examined, and 
the police found nothing remotely relating to drugs.72  Stephens had 
checked plaintiffs’ pockets, twice patted them down, and discovered 
nothing.73  The plaintiffs were never observed attempting to hide items on 
their persons.74  The court therefore concluded that the alleged action 
“violated Plaintiffs’ right to be free from an unreasonable search when he 
performed an investigatory strip search for drugs.”75 
While it concluded that the alleged initiation of the search violated 
Evans’ and Jordan’s Fourth Amendment rights, the court found that Officer 
Stephens was protected by qualified immunity, which “shields public 
officers from liability so long as the transgressed right, given the circum-
stances, was not already clearly established.”76  As the panel opinion noted, 
the issue was one of notice to a reasonable officer, and the en banc opinion 
cited the Eleventh Circuit’s formulation of the inquiry as follows: “The 
applicable law is clearly established if the ‘preexisting law dictates, that is, 
truly compel[s],’ the conclusion for all reasonable, similarly situated public 
officials that what Defendant was doing violated Plaintiffs’ federal rights in 
the circumstances.”77  The court observed that, “[i]n rare circumstances, a 
‘right may be so clear from the text of the Constitution or federal statute 
that no prior decision is necessary to give clear notice of it to an official,’”78 
but it added that in 1999, a post-arrest investigatory strip search “did not 
obviously violate the Fourth Amendment” or applicable precedents.79  In 
light of the Eleventh Circuit’s stringent focus on the clarity of precedent, 
the court’s reluctance in Evans to explore the precise parameters of the 
appropriate constitutional standard for the permissible initiation of a “post-
arrest investigatory” strip search may have obvious ramifications in future 
cases involving qualified immunity claims.  Nevertheless, as will be 
discussed, the court’s conclusion that, “at a minimum,” reasonable 
 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. at 1282. 
77. Id. (quoting Marsh v. Butler County, 268 F.3d 1014, 1031 (11th Cir. 2001) (en banc) 
(citation omitted)). 
78. Id. (quoting Rowe v. Ft. Lauderdale, 279 F.3d 1271, 1280 n.10 (11th Cir. 2002)). 
79. Id. at 1282-83.  Judge Barkett dissented with regard to this finding of qualified immunity.  
Id. at 1295-97 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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suspicion is required, parallels the conclusions of a significant number of 
other circuits. 
With regard to the plaintiffs’ second Fourth Amendment claim, the 
court found that, upon the plaintiffs’ account of the events, their rights were 
violated by the manner of the alleged searches, and Officer Stephens had no 
protection of qualified immunity on the issue.80  Once again, “taking the 
facts most favorable to Plaintiffs’ version,”81 the court characterized the 
manner of the alleged searches as “disturbing” and “degrading.”82  
Reviewing specific aspects of the allegations and recalling the Fourth 
Amendment’s requirement that a search be performed in a reasonable 
manner, the court noted that plaintiffs asserted that with “[l]ittle respect for 
privacy” they had been “taken to and searched in an abnormal place (thus, 
capable of exciting more fear)” and that each was allegedly “forced to 
disrobe, ridiculed, and penetrated by an object in front of the other.”83  The 
court characterized the alleged force as unnecessary, and stated that “[i]t 
matter[ed] that a body cavity search was undertaken.”84  In its review of the 
allegations, the court found “highly unsanitary” the claimed insertion of the 
same uncleaned baton or club into each arrestee’s anus and subsequent use 
of the still uncleaned item to lift each man’s testicles.85  It also found the 
alleged “terrifying,”86 “threatening and racist language”87 to contribute to 
the unreasonableness of the searches.88  Officer Stephens had no protection 
of qualified immunity with regard to the claim concerning the manner of 
the searches, because the text of the Fourth Amendment itself, which 
prohibits “unreasonable searches,” provided him sufficient notice.89  “Every 
objectively reasonable officer would have known that, when conducting a 
strip search, it is unreasonable to do so in the manner demonstrated by the 
sum of the facts alleged by Plaintiffs.”90 
With regard to the initiation of a strip search incident to arrest, the most 
basic assumption upon which Evans’ analysis rests remained unexplored in 
the opinion.  United States v. Robinson,91 the cornerstone for the 
 
80. Id. at 1281, 1283. 
81. Id. at 1281. 
82. Id. at 1281, 1283. 
83. Id. at 1281. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. 
86. Id. at 1282. 
87. Id. at 1281. 
88. Id. at 1282. 
89. Id. at 1283. 
90. Id. 
91. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
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proposition that the search of the person of an arrestee may proceed without 
a warrant, was cited without discussion.92  The Evans court made no men-
tion of any potential applicability of the warrant requirement to a “post-
arrest investigatory” strip search, and one can only conclude that the court 
found that issue to be sufficiently settled by Robinson and its progeny.93  
But was it?  Although the opinions addressing such strip searches in some 
of the other circuits have also neglected the matter of the warrant 
requirement, they have nevertheless often found it appropriate to discuss 
the reach of Robinson and its consideration of the interests of an arrestee in 
the integrity of his or her person. 
In Robinson, the defendant had been arrested for driving after the 
revocation of his driver’s permit, and, following a frisk which had detected 
an unidentifiable object, the arresting officer had retrieved and examined a 
crumpled cigarette package from Robinson’s left breast pocket.94  Robinson 
was convicted for possession of the heroin found in the package, and the 
Court held that the fact of the lawful arrest had authorized a warrantless 
“full search” of the arrestee’s person without the need for a preliminary 
limited frisk.95  Such a search of the person was justified by the need to 
protect the police from any concealed weapon, which might pose a threat 
during the prolonged personal contact of an arrest, and by the need to 
prevent the destruction of evidence.96  Rather than requiring the case-by-
case assessment of the facts that had characterized the doctrine permitting a 
limited frisk for weapons under Terry v. Ohio,97 the Court stated that police 
needed “no additional justification” apart from the fact of the lawful 
arrest.98  The bright-line character of this approach, designed to provide the 
police with a clear rule protecting officer safety, has continued to charac-
terize Robinson searches of the person incident to arrest.99 
In Swain v. Spinney,100 the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
encountered the issue of strip searches incident to arrest in the context of a 
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Massachusetts statute,101 which alleged a 
 
92. See Evans, 407 F.3d at 1279. 
93. See id. 
94. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 221-23. 
95. Id. at 234-35. 
96. Id. at 233-34. 
97. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
98. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
99. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect World: On 
Drawing “Bright Lines” and “Good Faith,” 43 U. PITT. L. REV. 307, 322-23 (1982) (discussing 
the Court’s use of a bright-line rule in Robinson). 
100. 117 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1997). 
101. Swain, 117 F.3d at 5; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 12 §§ 11H, 11I (1979). 
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violation of the Fourth Amendment and the Constitution of Massa-
chusetts.102  Reviewing a grant of summary judgment for the defendants,103 
the court set forth and addressed the following allegations by the plaintiff: 
On the morning of May 18, 1993, Kalli Swain and her boyfriend, 
Christopher Milbury, had been looking for an apartment around Danvers, 
Massachusetts when Milbury told her that he wished to stop at Moynihan 
Lumber for some items.104  Milbury entered the store while Swain remained 
in the car, and when he returned he placed a bag behind the seat.105  As they 
started to leave the parking area, Swain saw store employees pointing at 
their car and saw a police car pulling into the lot.106  Swain “became very 
upset [and] [s]he began questioning Milbury about what was going on.”107  
The police car followed them and pulled their car over.108 
As Officer Robert Marchionda approached the car, Milbury stepped 
out and was soon handcuffed.109  Swain then left the vehicle, dropping a 
bag of marijuana on the grass about three feet away from the car.110  The 
officer saw her do so, but at that time could not identify the item.111  Officer 
Marchionda radioed for backup, and another officer arrived.112 Swain 
approached the officers, asking “what was going on,” but was stopped and 
told that Milbury was suspected of theft from the lumber store.113  Officer 
Marchionda then arrested Swain and handcuffed her.114  While he was 
doing so, Officer Marchionda identified the object she had dropped as a 
“baggie” containing marijuana and retained it.115  Swain was frisked and 
nothing was found on her.116 
In the trunk of the car, the officers found $400 worth of hardware 
which had been taken from another store, and under the front seat they 
discovered $400 worth of sawblades wrapped in a hardware flyer.117  Swain 
 
102. Swain, 117 F.3d at 3, 11-12. 
103. Id. at 2. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. at 2-3. 
107. Id. at 3. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. 
112. Id. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. 
116. Id. 
117. Id. 
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was surprised to see the sawblades.118  When the police accused her of 
being an accomplice, she reiterated that she knew nothing about the theft, 
and Milbury told the police that she was innocent.119  The officers did not 
ask her about the marijuana, and she did not know if they were aware of 
it.120  After Swain and Milbury were taken to the North Reading police 
station, Swain’s handcuffs were removed and she was seated at a booking 
desk, where she signed a rights card.121  The police chief’s secretary, 
Matron Laura Spinney, was called to the desk because of Swain’s gen-
der.122  Swain asked to go to the bathroom, and Matron Spinney escorted 
her but did not enter the room.123  Spinney remained outside with the door 
ajar.124  When Swain returned to the booking area, she “was told that she 
could make a phone call.”125  She did so in an office and spoke with her 
attorney.126  Swain’s pocketbook was searched after her return to the 
booking area, and cigarette rolling papers were discovered.127  While no 
one discussed those papers with Swain, she was told that marijuana had 
been found earlier and that she would be charged.128  She denied that the 
marijuana was hers.129  At some point, Milbury claimed its ownership.130 
Plaintiff further alleged the following sequence of events: After Swain 
was fingerprinted and photographed, Sergeant Ed Hayes, the detective 
department supervisor, ordered Matron Spinney to escort Swain to a cell.131  
Spinney frisked Swain before doing so and found nothing.132  Swain was 
left alone in the cell, and alleged that after about twenty minutes, Hayes 
entered and for another period of about fifteen minutes “attempted to 
question [Swain] about Milbury’s criminal activities.  Hayes yelled at 
Swain, telling her that she was lying. . . .  Swain, who was crying hysteri-
cally, kept repeating that she honestly knew nothing.”133  Hayes allegedly 
 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. 
130. See id. at 9. 
131. Id. at 3. 
132. Id.  
133. Id. 
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“walked out in a huff.”134  Five to ten minutes later, Spinney returned and 
“apologetically informed Swain that Hayes had ordered her to strip search 
Swain.”135  Spinney did not know whether the strip search was ordered 
before or after Hayes spoke with Swain.136  Swain, who did not understand 
why she was being searched, began to cry again.137  She was told by 
Spinney that the video camera in the cell was turned off.138  Spinney 
allegedly ordered Swain “to remove all of her clothing except for her bra.  
Spinney shook out each item as Swain took it off.  Spinney then made 
Swain bend over and spread her buttocks.  Swain was very upset and 
shaking uncontrollably the entire time.”139  Nothing was found during the 
fifteen-minute procedure.140 
The court also recounted Hayes’s version of the events.  He stated that 
he ordered Swain’s strip search immediately upon his arrival at the booking 
desk, and, he believed, before he spoke with her.141  Spinney had not been 
told what to look for, but assumed that she was looking for drugs because 
she was aware that marijuana had been found earlier at the scene.142  Both 
Hayes and Spinney stated that they were unaware that the town of North 
Reading had a policy with regard to strip searches,143 and Hayes testified 
that he ordered the strip searches “whenever narcotics were involved in the 
case.”144  Having examined Milbury’s record during booking, Hayes had 
known that he had a history of drug convictions and was on probation.145  
 
134. Id.  In his testimony, Hayes stated that he only remained with Swain for about a minute 
and did not recall what was said.  Id. at 3-4.  Milbury, who was in another cell, stated that he 
heard Hayes talking to Swain and heard her crying and maintaining her innocence.  Id. at 4. 
135. Id. at 4. 
136. Id.  Spinney stated that the order came “almost immediately” after she brought Swain to 
the cell, rather than a “significant” time later. Id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id.  Spinney did not recall discussing the camera with Swain.  Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. 
141. Id.  In addition to testifying that he ordered the search because of his practice con-
cerning drug arrests, Hayes stated that he suspected Swain of carrying a concealed weapon, 
“although he acknowledge[d] that this was a generalized suspicion of narcotics suspects, rather 
than a suspicion based on any characteristics of Swain.”  Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 5.  While the town’s written policy stated that a strip search of an arrestee was 
warranted “only if the police have probable cause to believe the arrestee is concealing contraband 
or weapons on his body,” and the Municipal Police Institute’s policies (allegedly adhered to by 
North Reading) required “reasonable suspicion,” the town police chief testified that all arrestees 
were strip searched “in any arrest involving drugs.”  Id. at 4, 5. 
144. Id. at 5. 
145. Id. at 4. 
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Milbury was not strip-searched.146  Swain had no prior convictions.147  The 
charges against Swain were later nol prossed.148 
Swain’s action was filed against Spinney, Hayes and the town of North 
Reading, and on defendants’ motion for summary judgment the district 
court found no violation of her federal or state constitutional rights and that, 
in any event, the individual defendants were entitled to qualified immu-
nity.149  The town’s motion was granted on the ground that the standards for 
municipal liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 had not been met.150  On appeal, 
Swain argued that probable cause was necessary for the strip search of an 
arrestee.151 
The First Circuit held that Swain’s allegations had stated a sufficient 
claim against the individual defendants, and that “[a] strip and visual body 
cavity search of an arrestee must be justified, at the least, by a reasonable 
suspicion.”152  The court added that, although this standard was clearly 
established at the time of the search, it was not possible to resolve the 
immunity issue on summary judgment because of significant factual 
disputes.153 
The court’s discussion of the appropriate standard began with a 
quotation of Robinson’s observation that “[i]n the case of a lawful custodial 
arrest[,] a full search of the person is not only an exception to the warrant 
requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also a ‘reasonable’ search 
under that Amendment.”154  As a result, if an arrest is lawful an officer does 
not need any additional justification to perform a full body search of an ar-
restee.155  The court also observed that, under United States v. Edwards,156 
a search incident to arrest need not occur at the arrest scene, but may later 
 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
148. Id. at 2. 
149. Id. at 5. 
150. Id.  This aspect of the district court’s ruling was affirmed on appeal.  Id. at 11. 
151. Id. at 5. 
152. Id. 
153. See id. at 5.  The court stated that factual issues such as the timing of the search must be 
resolved by the trier of fact before it could be determined whether the defendants’ conduct was 
objectively reasonable.  Id. at 10.  In addition, “further resolution of the facts [was] necessary to 
determine whether or not this case falls into the category of ‘close cases’ in which the police are 
accorded ‘a fairly wide zone of protection.’” Id. (quoting Roy v. Inhabitants of Lewiston, 42 F.3d 
691, 695 (1st Cir. 1994)). 
154. Id. at 5 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
155. Id. at 5-6. 
156. 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
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be conducted upon the arrestee’s arrival “at the place of detention.”157  It 
added, “[h]owever, Robinson did not hold that all possible searches of an 
arrestee’s body are automatically permissible as a search incident to arrest.  
To the contrary, any such search must still be reasonable . . . .”158  The court 
noted Edwards’ observation that “[h]olding the Warrant Clause inappli-
cable to the circumstances present here does not leave law enforcement 
officials subject to no restraints.  This type of police conduct ‘must [still] be 
tested by the Fourth Amendment’s general proscription against unreason-
able searches and seizures.’”159  Most significantly, the court observed that 
in Robinson, the Supreme Court had noted that the search involved “did not 
have ‘extreme or patently abusive characteristics.’”160  The First Circuit 
therefore observed that “‘Robinson simply did not authorize’ a strip and 
visual body cavity search.”161  Accordingly, such a search requires “inde-
pendent analysis under the Fourth Amendment.”162 
The court then went on to discuss the approach of Bell v. Wolfish,163 in 
which the Supreme Court permitted “a prison policy that required arraigned 
pre-trial detainees to ‘expose their body cavities for visual inspection as a 
part of a strip search conducted after every contact visit with a person from 
outside the institution.’”164  The First Circuit noted that in Wolfish, the 
Supreme Court had stated that the practice “instinctively [gave] the Court 
‘the most pause,’”165 and its analysis required “a balancing of the need for 
the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the search 
entails.  Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the 
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the 
place in which it is conducted.”166 
 
157. Swain, 117 F.3d at 6 (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803).  In Edwards, the Court per-
mitted the search of an arrestee’s clothing at the stationhouse ten hours after he had been placed 
under arrest.  Edwards, 415 U.S. at 803-08. 
158. Swain, 117 F.3d at 6. 
159. Id. (quoting Edwards, 415 U.S. at 808 n.9).  The court added that later, in Illinois v. 
Lafayette, the Supreme Court explicitly stated that neither Edwards nor Lafayette addressed “the 
circumstances in which a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate.”  Swain, 117 
F.3d at 6.  See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 646 n.2 (1983) (permitting the inventory search 
of an arrestee’s shoulder bag). 
160. Id. (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973)).  In Robinson, the 
Court observed that “[w]hile thorough, the search partook of none of the extreme or patently 
abusive characteristics which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).”  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. 
161. Swain, 117 F.3d at 6 (quoting Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry, 950 F.2d 1437, 1446 (9th Cir. 
1991)). 
162. Id. 
163. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
164. Swain, 117 F.3d at 6 (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 558). 
165. Id. (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559). 
166. Id. (quoting Wolfish, 441 U.S. at 559). 
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In Swain, the court further observed that Wolfish did not “read out of 
the Constitution” the generally applicable requirement “that a search be 
justified as reasonable under the circumstances.”167  Applying the “Wolfish 
balancing test” to the case before it, the court observed that it had judicially 
acknowledged that visual body cavity searches “impinge seriously upon the 
values that the Fourth Amendment was meant to protect.”168  An arrestee is 
required “not only to strip naked in front of a stranger, but also to expose 
the most private areas of her body to others.”169  “This is often . . . done 
while the person arrested is required to assume degrading and humiliating 
positions.”170  The court noted that the First Circuit had previously de-
scribed such interference with a person’s privacy as “severe if not gross,”171 
and “an offense to the dignity of the individual.”172  The court also quoted 
the Seventh Circuit’s statement in Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago,173 
discussed below,174 where it had cited both the “demeaning” and “dehu-
manizing” characteristics of visual body cavity searches and the “degrada-
tion and submission” they entail.175  Wolfish’s balancing approach also 
required that law enforcement’s legitimate needs be considered by the 
court, as was the imperative of institutional security in that case.176  The 
First Circuit acknowledged that some other courts have held that “the need 
to discover and preserve concealed evidence of a crime” may justify a war-
rantless strip search.177  In light of these concerns, the court held that a strip 
and visual body cavity search of an arrestee “must be justified by at least a 
reasonable suspicion that the arrestee is concealing contraband or 
weapons.”178 
With regard to the allegations before it, viewing them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, the court found that Swain brought a “trialworthy 
claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”179  The court stated that on the facts alleged 
 
167. Id. (quoting Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 800 (2d Cir. 1986), cert denied sub nom. 
County of Monroe v. Weber, 483 U.S. 1020 (1987)). 
168. Id. 
169. Id. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. (quoting Arruda v. Fair, 710 F.2d 886, 887 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 
999 (1983)). 
172. Id. (quoting Wood v. Clemons, 89 F.3d 922, 928 (1st Cir. 1996)). 
173. 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983). 
174. See infra notes 197-252 and accompanying text. 
175. Swain, 117 F.3d at 6-7 (quoting Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
176. Id. at 7. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. at 8. 
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“there appears to be the distinct possibility that Officer Hayes ordered the 
strip search in retaliation for his failed interrogation of Swain in her cell, 
imposing sexual humiliation on her as a punishment for what he perceived 
as her non-cooperation.”180  The court said that such an inference was 
raised by Hayes’s alleged anger after their conversation and by the timing 
of the search.181  It then proceeded to discuss whether “an objective officer 
would have had a reasonable suspicion that Swain was concealing drugs or 
contraband on her person.”182  The court stated that three factors reflected 
the inadequacy of any grounds for that conclusion.  The first factor was the 
timing of the search, which was significant in several respects.  The search 
was conducted after Swain had been alone in the cell for some time “and no 
one thought it important to search her before she angered Hayes.”183  The 
court added, “[p]erhaps more importantly, she had been allowed to go to the 
bathroom by herself, unobserved, prior to being taken to her cell.”184  This 
indicated “that no one thought she had secreted drugs in her private 
parts.”185  If “there was any reason to believe such evidence still existed, 
further delay to obtain a warrant would not have significantly increased the 
risk of destruction,” especially in light of the observation by video camera 
in the cell.186  Second, as there was no risk of contact with other prisoners, 
or that Swain would “be able to smuggle contraband into a secure environ-
ment,” the institutional security justification appeared to be absent.187  As a 
third factor, the court cited the “differential treatment” by the police of 
Swain and Milbury.188  The two had been stopped because of the latter’s 
shoplifting, and Hayes knew of Milbury’s probation and drug convic-
tions.189  Swain, in contrast, had no criminal record, and Milbury “had told 
the officers, including Hayes, that the marijuana was his.”190  But “Milbury 
was not strip searched.”191  “If there was an objective basis—apart from 
retaliation—for stripping Swain, it would have been objectively reasonable, 
and more so, to search Milbury as well.”192  While the court did observe 
 
180. Id. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. (This was a rare reference to the warrant process in the opinion.) 
187. Id. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 8-9. 
190. Id. at 9. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
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that Swain had dropped a baggie of marijuana and Hayes had expressed the 
view that a strip search was appropriate in all narcotics cases,193 the court 
added that the record did not reveal how much marijuana was involved or 
whether possession of that quantity constituted a misdemeanor or a felony 
under state law.194  Nothing indicated that Swain was suspected of being a 
drug distributor, and her possession of “some unspecified amount of mari-
juana is not enough to overcome, as a matter of law, the [above] factors . . . 
under which a jury could find the search of Swain unreasonable.”195  
Consequently, Swain had “stated a claim for [the] violation of her Fourth 
Amendment right[s].”196 
In 1983, in Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit 
addressed a challenge to the city’s policy, existing from 1952 to 1980, 
which “required a strip search and a visual inspection of the body cavities 
of all women arrested and detained in the City lockups, regardless of the 
charges.”197  No similar policy applied to men.198  The four female plain-
tiffs had been arrested for misdemeanors and allegedly strip searched in city 
lockups “while awaiting the arrival of bail money.”199  Three of the 
plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit (the “Jane Does” case),200 seeking to 
establish the unconstitutionality of the policy as applied to those “de-
tained . . . for an offense no greater than a traffic violation or a misde-
meanor”201 on both Fourth Amendment and equal protection grounds, and 
requesting damages and injunctive relief.202  Another, Mary Ann Tikalsky, 
had sued for false arrest and excessive force as well as unlawful search.203  
In Jane Does, the parties had entered into an agreement and stipulation 
before trial, settling the claims for injunctive relief but admitting no 
liability.204  In fact, before that stipulation and agreement, the disclosure of 
the city’s policy “moved the Illinois legislature to amend the Illinois statute 
 
193. Id.  The court found Hayes’s statement inconsistent with the town’s policy and “belied 
by his failure to strip search Milbury.”  Id. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id.  On plaintiff’s state law claim, the court concluded that because the Massachusetts 
Constitution provided at least the level of protection against strip and visual body cavity searches 
as did the Fourth Amendment, her state law claim against the individual defendants should be 
reinstated.  Id. at 11-12. 
197. Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983). 
198. Id. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 1266, 1267 n.2.  See Jane Does v. City of Chicago, No. 79 C 789, 1982 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 14417, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1982). 
201. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267 n.2. 
202. Id. at 1266. 
203. Id. at 1267. 
204. Id. at 1266. 
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governing ‘Rights on Arrest’ to prohibit strip searches of persons arrested 
for traffic, regulatory, or misdemeanor offenses” without a reasonable be-
lief that weapons or contraband is concealed on the arrestee’s person.205  In 
Jane Does, the district court granted plaintiffs’ motion to sever the issues of 
liability and constitutionality, and plaintiffs moved for partial summary 
judgment, arguing that Chicago’s policy was unconstitutional on its face.206  
The district court agreed, finding it violative of the Fourth Amendment and 
the Equal Protection Clauses of the federal and Illinois constitutions.207  
The court ordered that “typical cases” be selected for trial on the issue of 
damages,208 and it returned damage awards for Mary Beth G., Sharon N.  
and Hinda Hoffman.209  The city appealed both the determination that the 
policy was unconstitutional and the damage awards.210  In the civil rights 
action by Mary Ann Tikalsky, a jury trial resulted in the acquittal of the 
defendants of the charges of false arrest and use of excessive force, but the 
plaintiff’s claim of illegal search was successful and compensatory 
damages were awarded.211 
While the court of appeals acknowledged that the “circumstances 
surrounding the arrests and detentions of each of the plaintiffs-appellees . . . 
are not identical,” each woman alleged that she had been subjected to 
Chicago’s strip search policy after a misdemeanor arrest.212  Mary Beth G.  
and Sharon N. had been arrested because of outstanding parking tickets.213  
Hinda Hoffman was stopped for making an illegal left turn and arrested for 
failing to produce a driver’s license.214  Mary Ann Tikalsky was arrested for 
disorderly conduct.215  The court described Chicago’s policy as follows: 
 
205. Id. at 1266 n.1. 
206. Id. at 1266. 
207. Id. 
208. Id.  The damages issue did not proceed as a class action but instead as individual trials, 
since the district court found that the proposed class did not meet the requirements under FED. R. 
CIV. P. 23 (b)(3).  Id. at 1267 n.2. 
209. Id. at 1266.  Mary Beth G. and Sharon N. were awarded $25,000, and Hinda Hoffman 
was awarded $60,000.  Id. 
210. Id. 
211. Id. at 1267.  Mary Ann Tikalsky had initially been awarded $30,000 against the city and 
an individual defendant.  The district court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor 
of the individual defendant.  While it then ordered a new trial against the city because of the jury 
instruction, the Court of Appeals reversed that judgment and ordered the verdict and award 
reinstated.  Tikalsky v. City of Chicago, 687 F.2d 175, 182 (7th Cir. 1982).  In Mary Beth G., the 
city appealed the reinstated judgment.  Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1267. 
212. Id. 
213. Id. at 1267 n.2. 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 1267 n.2. 
       
2007] STRIP SEARCHES 87 
That policy, as described by the City, required each woman placed 
in the detention facilities of the Chicago Police Department and 
searched by female police personnel to: 
1)  lift her blouse or sweater and to unhook and lift her brassiere to 
allow a visual inspection of the breast area, to replace these 
articles of clothing and then 
2) to pull up her skirt or dress or to lower her pants and pull down 
any undergarments, to squat two or three time facing the detention 
aide and to bend over at the waist to permit visual inspection of the 
vaginal and anal area.216 
The policy was not applied to males.217  Instead, males were thoroughly 
searched by hand and strip searched only if there was reason to believe that 
they had concealed weapons or contraband.218 
The court began its analysis with the terms of the Fourth Amendment 
itself, with its guarantee that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.”219  
Viewing its task as the determination of whether the city’s policy was 
“unreasonable under established [F]ourth [A]mendment principles,”220 the 
court began with the observation that “searches of the person are generally 
impermissible absent a search warrant.”221  It characterized the city’s 
position as resting upon two “related” exceptions stemming from the arrest 
process: the first permitting “warrantless searches incident to custodial 
arrest;” and the second permitting “warrantless searches incident to the 
detention of persons lawfully arrested.”222  With regard to the latter, the 
court quoted the Supreme Court’s observation in Illinois v. Lafayette223 that 
“the factors justifying a search of the person and personal effects of an 
arrestee upon reaching a police station but prior to being placed in 
confinement are somewhat different from the factors justifying an 
immediate search at the time and place of arrest.”224  It also observed that 
the Lafayette Court considered a search at the place of detention as part of 
 
216. Id. at 1267. 
217. Id. at 1268. 
218. Id.  
219. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
220. Id. 
221. Id. 
222. Id. 
223. 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
224. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1269 (quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645). 
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the arrest procedure, “since ‘that is no more than a continuation of the 
custody inherent in the arrest status.’”225 
The Seventh Circuit thus separately addressed both what it termed a 
“search incident to arrest” at the scene and the search of an arrestee at the 
police station.226  Examining the former, the court recalled that the excep-
tion to the warrant requirement arose “because of the need ‘to remove any 
weapons that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or 
effect his escape’ and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of 
evidence.”227  The Court discussed Robinson’s statement that an officer 
need not assess the likelihood of these possibilities in an individual case, 
“but may undertake a ‘full search’” of an arrestee.228  It observed, “[i]t is 
worth noting, however, that in reaching this conclusion the Court was 
concerned mainly with whether a search calculated to disarm the suspect 
and to preserve evidence on the suspect’s person could be undertaken, not 
with the intensity of the particular search itself.”229  The Court added that 
Robinson “did not suggest that a person validly arrested may be subject to 
any search the arresting officer feels is necessary.”230  The court continued: 
The majority [in Robinson] merely concluded that because each 
arrest brings with it certain factors . . . the application of a 
straightforward rule that always permits a concomitant “full 
search” incident to custodial arrest aimed toward the discovery of 
weapons and contraband would conclusively be presumed to be a 
reasonable one. . . .  Under Robinson, a “full search” is the maxi-
mum intensity of the search allowable to achieve that end, unless 
specific reasons exist that justify intensifying the search.  In 
characterizing what constitutes a full search incident to arrest, the 
Robinson Court quoted with approval language from Terry that 
describes a reasonable search incident to arrest as one involving “a 
relatively extensive exploration of the person[.]” . . . The majority 
[in Robinson] specifically noted that it would be willing to find un-
constitutional a search that was “extreme or patently abusive.”231 
 
225. Id. at 1270 (quoting Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 645). 
226. Id. at 1268-69. 
227. Id. at 1269 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
228. Id. 
229. Id. (emphasis in original). 
230. Id. (emphasis in original). 
231. Id. at 1269-70 (emphasis omitted) (internal citations omitted).  With regard to the 
court’s last statement, the quoted language of Robinson (set forth earlier at note 160), appeared as 
follows: “[w]hile thorough, the search partook of none of the extreme or patently abusive 
characteristics which were held to violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
in Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).”  Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. 
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The court concluded that “the Robinson Court simply did not contemplate 
the significantly greater intrusion that occurred here.”232 
The Seventh Circuit’s discussion of an exception to the warrant 
requirement when the search of an arrestee is delayed until the stationhouse 
brought it to a similar conclusion.  It discussed United States v. Edwards,233 
in which the Supreme Court permitted the police to exchange, search and 
test the clothing of an arrestee for traces of destructible evidence after he 
had been in custody for ten hours,234 and it also cited the Court’s discussion 
in Illinois v. Lafayette,235 in which it had permitted the inventory search of 
an arrestee’s shoulder bag before incarceration.236  The Seventh Circuit 
noted that in Lafayette the Supreme Court expressly stated, “[w]e were not 
addressing in Edwards, and do not discuss here, the circumstances in which 
a strip search of an arrestee may or may not be appropriate.”237  The 
Seventh Circuit concluded: 
Indeed, the focus in Edwards, as in Robinson, once again seems to 
have been on the permissible scope of searches incident to arrest; 
the Court accepted the proposition that the scope of the search at 
the stationhouse could be at least as broad as that at the time of the 
arrest, thus approving the search of items that were on the arrestee 
at the time of the arrest.238 
In the court’s view, Edwards also reaffirmed “the controlling princi-
ple” that searches incident to arrest must be reasonable.239  Examining that 
issue and applying the balancing test of Wolfish,240 the court then 
characterized “strip searches involving the visual inspection of the anal and 
genital areas as ‘demeaning, dehumanizing, undignified, humiliating, terri-
fying, unpleasant, embarrassing, repulsive, signifying degradation and 
submission.’”241  It continued, “[i]n short, we can think of few exercises of 
authority by the state that intrude on the citizen’s privacy and dignity as 
 
232. Id. at 1271. 
233. 415 U.S. 800 (1974). 
234. Edwards, 415 U.S. at 800.  The Court later said that it had “made clear” in Edwards that 
“the interests supporting a search incident to arrest would hardly justify disrobing an arrestee on 
the street.”  Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983). 
235. 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
236. Lafayette, 462 U.S. at 648. 
237. Id. at 646 n.2.  The court also found Bell v. Wolfish to be inapposite because of its 
institutional context.  Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263, 1272 (7th Cir. 1983). 
238. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1270. 
239. Id. 
240. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).  See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text. 
241. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d. at 1272 (quoting Tinetti v. Wittke, 620 F.2d 120 (7th Cir. 
1980)). 
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severely as the visual anal and genital searches practiced here.”242  Weighed 
against this intrusion was the governmental interest involved.243  The city 
had asserted the need to maintain security in the lockup, and the need “was 
apparently felt to be so great that women misdemeanants were strip 
searched even when there was no reason to believe they were hiding weap-
ons or contraband on their persons.”244  The court found that the evidence 
belied these concerns.245  The affidavits of lockup personnel, “which 
lack[ed] specificity,” indicated that “only a few items have been recovered 
from the body cavities of women arrested on minor charges over the 
years.”246  The one analytical study introduced, which was conducted in 
1965 and discussed the strip searches of 1800 women over a thirty-five day 
period, indicated that items were taken from the body cavities of women 
“charged with either prostitution (7 items), assault (1 item), or a narcotics 
violation (1 item).”247  The court added that “[t]hese are the kinds of crimes, 
unlike traffic or other minor offenses, that might give rise to a reasonable 
belief that the woman arrestee was concealing an item in a body cavity.”248  
The court found that the evidence did not support the city’s assertion “that 
those dangers are created by women minor offenders entering the lockups 
for short periods while awaiting bail.”249  Consequently, because of their 
insubstantial relationship to security needs, the searches alleged “[could] 
not be considered ‘reasonable.’”250  With regard to the appropriate standard 
for the initiation of strip searches of arrestees, the court noted that 
[t]he more intrusive the search, the closer governmental authorities 
must come to demonstrating probable cause for believing that the 
search will uncover the objects for which the search is being 
conducted. . . . [W]e agree with the district court in Jane Does that 
ensuring the security needs of the City by strip searching 
plaintiffs-appellees was unreasonable without a reasonable 
 
242. Id.  The court also cited the views of Justices Marshall and Stevens in their dissenting 
opinions in Wolfish: “see also [Bell v. Wolfish,] 441 U.S. at 576-77 . . . (Marshall, J., dissenting) 
(‘the body cavity searches of MCC inmates represent one of the most grievous offenses against 
personal dignity, and common decency’); 441 U.S. at 594, . . . (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘the body-
cavity search—clearly the greatest personal indignity—may be the least justifiable measure of all 
[the security practices at the institution].’).”  Id. 
243. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1272. 
244. Id. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. at 1272-73. 
248. Id. at 1273. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. 
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suspicion by the authorities that either of the twin dangers of 
concealing weapons or contraband existed.251 
The court also found that the city’s policy violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.252 
The Seventh Circuit’s concern about the application of a blanket strip 
search policy to those arrested for minor crimes was paralleled by the later 
opinion of the Fifth Circuit in Stewart v. Lubbock County.253  In terms 
narrower than those employed in the discussion by the Seventh Circuit, the 
Stewart court confined its focus to the strip searches of “minor offenders 
awaiting bond.”254  The Lubbock County jail’s policy permitted the strip 
search of any arrestee without regard to individualized suspicion or the 
severity of the charge.255  Arrestees for “misdemeanors punishable by fine 
only” were therefore included.256  Lubbock County conducted about 1,000 
strip searches per month “before arraignment and before the arrestee had an 
opportunity to arrange for bail.”257  The two plaintiffs on the consolidated 
appeal had sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged strip searches 
conducted after their respective arrests for public intoxication and issuing a 
bad check after a routine traffic stop.258  The court relied upon the analysis 
in Mary Beth G. holding: 
Because Lubbock County’s strip search policy was applied to 
minor offenders awaiting bond when no reasonable suspicion 
existed that they as a category of offenders or individually might 
possess weapons or contraband, under the balancing test of 
Wolfish we find such searches unreasonable and the policy to be in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.259 
The Second Circuit adopted a similar policy with regard to strip 
searches of those arrested for minor offenses.  A United States District 
Court recently observed that the circuit “has firmly held that strip searches 
of persons lawfully arrested for minor infractions (misdemeanors and 
violations) must be justified by an individualized reasonable suspicion of 
 
251. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
252. Id. at 1273-74.  The city failed to demonstrate an “exceedingly persuasive justification” 
for its conclusion that a difference in gender “made it necessary to strip search only women . . . 
and unnecessary to search the body cavities of males, which can be and occasionally are used to 
conceal weapons or contraband.”  Id. at 1274. 
253. 767 F.2d 153 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1066 (1986). 
254. Lubbock, 767 F.2d at 156. 
255. Id. at 154. 
256. Id. 
257. Id. 
258. Id. at 154 n.1, 155 n.2. 
259. Id. at 156-57. 
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concealed weapons or contraband.”260  It also acknowledged that the 
Second Circuit has not “spoken directly to the appropriate test for the valid-
ity of a strip search incident to a felony arrest.”261  The district court found 
it appropriate to apply the “particularized reasonable suspicion test” to a 
felony arrest as well.262 
The Seventh Circuit’s discussion in Mary Beth G. of Chicago’s 
proffered analytical study, together with the court’s observation that there 
are “kinds of crimes . . . that may give rise to a reasonable belief that [a] 
woman arrestee was concealing an item in a body cavity,”263 raises a basic 
question about the extent to which the inherent nature of the offense alleged 
might in itself be probative.  The Tenth Circuit, which has also endorsed the 
view that reasonable suspicion is a necessary predicate for a strip search 
incident to arrest, has addressed this issue in connection with allegations 
surrounding an arrest for driving under the influence of drugs.  In Foote v. 
Spiegel,264 in the context of denying a defendant qualified immunity in a 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 action, the court reviewed its policy.265  It was alleged that 
police stopped Plaintiff Foote’s car because of a suspected alteration of the 
vehicle’s paper temporary registration permit, and because she had been 
driving slowly in the left lane.266  While the officer’s suspicion concerning 
the registration proved to be groundless, his and an expert officer’s obser-
vations led to their belief that Foote had been driving under the influence of 
marijuana.267  She was arrested, but was not placed in the general jail 
population at the stationhouse.268  Foote alleged that she was strip searched 
at the request of one of the officers, and asserted that this was pursuant to a 
practice under which “[a]ll persons arrested on drug charges [were] 
subjected to strip searches.”269  The police found no drugs.270  Almost a 
year earlier, that same jail’s blanket policy of conducting such strip 
searches had been held unconstitutional by the Tenth Circuit in Cottrell v. 
 
260. Sarnicola v. County of Westchester, 229 F. Supp. 2d 259, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  See 
Weber v. Dell, 804 F.2d 796, 802 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied sub nom., County of Monroe v. 
Weber, 483 U.S. 1020 (applying the particularized reasonable suspicion test); Kaufman v. Rivera, 
No. 98-7888, 1999 WL 197199, at *2 (2d Cir. Apr. 1, 1999). 
261. Sarnicola, 229 F. Supp. 2d at 270. 
262. Id. at 270-75. 
263. Mary Beth G., 723 F.2d at 1273. 
264. 118 F.3d 1416 (10th Cir. 1997). 
265. Foote, 118 F.3d at 1419. 
266. Id. at 1419. 
267. Id. at 1420. 
268. Id. at 1420-21. 
269. Id. at 1421. 
270. Id. 
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Kaysville City.271  Foote was released on bond shortly after the alleged 
search and the charges were dropped after the receipt of the negative results 
of a urine test.272 
Denying the officer qualified immunity, the court stated that in May, 
1994, it was clearly established that “reasonable suspicion that the arrestee 
has drugs or weapons hidden on his or her person” must exist before a strip 
search of “a person arrested for driving while under the influence of drugs 
but not placed in the general jail population.”273  The court noted that, 
according to the facts alleged, the police had no particularized reasons to 
believe that Foote had drugs on her person.274  She was not suspected of 
smuggling, and a thorough pat-down search revealed nothing.275  The court 
stated that while it may be reasonable to believe that a person driving under 
the influence might have marijuana in a pocket container or elsewhere in 
the vehicle, Foote had “no opportunity to hide anything beneath her 
clothing.”276  It continued, noting “the strip search could be justified only if 
it were reasonable to believe persons driving while under the influence of 
marijuana, who have no particular reason to expect they will be searched, 
routinely carry a personal stash in a body cavity.  That belief is 
unreasonable.”277 
In a 1987 unpublished opinion, the Fourth Circuit made an arguably 
different generalization.  The court in DeSantis v. Peregoy278 found that a 
strip search was permissible based upon the “sound determination that drug 
offenders are very likely to be carrying contraband.”279  DeSantis had not 
been charged with personal drug use or driving under the influence, 
however.  He had instead been misidentified and arrested along with thirty-
one others as participants in an alleged “drug operation.”280 
The leading Fourth Circuit case in the area, Amaechi v. West,281 
emphasizes the balancing of interests inherent in the determination of 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness, in the context of reviewing allegations 
 
271. 994 F.2d 730, 734 (10th Cir. 1993). 
272. Foote, 118 F.3d at 1421. 
273. Id. at 1425. 
274. Id. 
275. Id. at 1425-26. 
276. Id. at 1426. 
277. Id.  See also Way v. County of Ventura, 445 F.3d 1157, 1160-62 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(determining that a blanket policy authorizing strip searches of all alleged drug offenders upon 
booking is unconstitutional). 
278. 1987 WL 37310 (4th Cir. May 5, 1987). 
279. DeSantis, 1987 WL at *1. 
280. Id. 
281. 237 F.3d 356 (4th Cir. 2001). 
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in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action of both a public strip search and the 
penetration of female genitalia by a male officer.282  As before, upon the 
appeal of a denial of the defendant officer’s motion for summary judgment 
based upon a claim of qualified immunity, the court “accept[ed]” and 
examined the following version of events asserted by the plaintiff: Lisa 
Amaechi resided with her husband and five young children in a townhouse 
in Dumfries, Virginia.283  The children played music loudly, resulting in a 
neighbor’s complaint to the police in August of 1997.284  Officer Stephen 
Hargrave of the Dumfries Police Department responded to the complaint, 
told Amaechi to lower the volume, and she did so.285  Officer Hargrave 
allegedly said that she would not be arrested unless another complaint about 
noise was received.286  Amaechi believed that Hargrave had been impolite 
and complained to the Prince William County Police Department about the 
matter.287  According to her assertions, two days later, without any 
additional complaints about noise, Hargrave obtained a misdemeanor arrest 
warrant charging Amaechi for the earlier violation of the Dumfries noise 
ordinance.288  At 9:00 p.m. that evening, two other officers, Sergeant 
Bernard Pfluger and trainee Matthew West, arrived at the Amaechis’ 
townhouse to execute the warrant.289 
Amaechi’s allegations concerning subsequent events, recited by the 
court, provided the basis for her constitutional claim: Amaechi stated that 
when the police knocked on the door, she was in her upstairs bathroom, 
nude, preparing for bed.290  She covered herself with a housedress and 
accompanied her husband downstairs.291  The housedress, made of light 
weight fabric, “had buttonholes all the way down the front.”292  All of the 
buttons “from immediately below the chest” were missing, however, 
“requiring Amaechi to gather the dress with her hand to keep it closed.”293  
When the couple opened the door, Sergeant Pfluger told Ms. Amaechi that 
she was under arrest.294  She cooperated fully, but when she was told that 
 
282. Amaechi, 237 F.3d at 359. 
283. Id. at 358-59. 
284. Id. 
285. Id. 
286. Id. 
287. Id.  Amaechi did not call the Dumfries police because she believed that they would 
have been unresponsive.  Id. at 359 n.4. 
288. Id. at 359. 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
291. Id. 
292. Id. at 359 n.7. 
293. Id. 
294. Id. at 359. 
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she was to be handcuffed, she “pointed out to the officers that she was 
completely naked under the dress and requested permission to get dressed 
because she would no longer be able to hold her dress closed once 
handcuffed.”295  She was denied permission to do so.296  When her hands 
were cuffed behind her back, her dress fell open below her chest.297  
Amaechi was then allegedly escorted by West out to the police car, walking 
past several other officers.298  Amaechi stated that before she was permitted 
to enter the police car, West informed her that he would have to search 
her.299  She protested that she was wearing no underwear, but West 
allegedly stated that the search was necessary.300  According to Amaechi, 
West stood in front of her, “squeezed her hips, and inside her opened dress, 
‘swiped’ one ungloved hand, palm up, across her bare vagina, at which time 
the tip of his finger slightly penetrated Amaechi’s genitals.”301  She stated 
that she jumped back, exclaiming, “I told you I don’t have on any 
underwear,” and that West did not respond.302  West allegedly placed his 
hand upon her buttocks, “knead[ing]” them.303  West then permitted her to 
enter the car.304  The search occurred in front of Amaechi’s townhouse, 
“where the other police officers, Amaechi’s husband, her five children, and 
all of her neighbors had the opportunity to observe.”305  Amaechi was never 
convicted of the misdemeanor, and her dispute with the neighbor was 
resolved through mediation.306 
Amaechi sued West, Pfluger and the town of Dumfries under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 and state law, alleging, inter alia, the unconstitutionality of 
the search and an assault and battery on West’s part.307  The district court 
granted summary judgment on the counts concerning Pfluger and the 
town,308 and denied West’s motion for summary judgment based upon a 
 
295. Id. 
296. Id. 
297. Id. 
298. Id. 
299. Id. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. 
302. Id. 
303. Id. 
304. Id. at 359-60. 
305. Id. at 360. 
306. Id. at 359 n.5. 
307. Id. at 360, 360 n.9.  Counts alleging the intentional infliction of emotional distress by 
West and the unconstitutionality of the town’s policy permitting arrest for violation of the noise 
ordinance were voluntarily withdrawn.  Id. at 360. 
308. Id.  Amaechi did not cross-appeal these rulings.  Id. at 360 n.8. 
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defense of qualified immunity.309  On appeal, the court addressed “whether 
Amaechi’s complaint has alleged a deprivation of her constitutional right to 
be free from an unreasonable search and . . . whether that right was clearly 
established at the time of her arrest.”310 
With regard to the former issue, the court was less than receptive to 
West’s argument that Robinson’s policy permitting a search of an arrestee 
“includes the right to briefly ‘swipe’ the arrestee’s outer genitalia and 
slightly penetrate the genitalia.”311 
Robinson did not, nor could it, rewrite the Fourth Amendment to 
exclude the explicit requirement that no search be unreasonable.  
Nor did Robinson hold that all searches incident to arrest, no 
matter how invasive, are inherently reasonable.  To the contrary, 
since Robinson, the Supreme Court has continued to emphasize 
that Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prohibits unreasonable 
searches incident to arrest . . . .  Therefore, to determine whether 
West’s search of Amaechi is constitutional, it is not enough to 
conclude that it was a search incident to a valid arrest.  Rather, we 
must determine whether the search was unreasonable.312 
The court turned to the balancing approach of Bell v. Wolfish, 
concluding that the highly intrusive search that was alleged had no apparent 
justification.313  It noted that Amaechi had peacefully submitted to an arrest 
for a two-day-old misdemeanor noise violation, and she had advised the 
police that she was wearing no underclothes.314  The court stated that 
instead of granting her request to dress before being handcuffed, “the 
officers secured [her] hands behind her back and made her walk to the car 
and stand in the street with her dress open and lower body exposed.”315  
West’s alleged subsequent “touching and penetrating [of] Amaechi’s 
genitalia and kneading [of] her buttocks with his ungloved hand” was 
likewise “subject to viewing by Amaechi’s family, the public, and the other 
officers.”316  No perceived threat to the officers’ safety was offered as 
justification for the manner of the search, and “[i]n fact, West could not rely 
upon any type of security justification . . . in that the dress was thin and was 
 
309. Id. at 360. 
310. Id. 
311. Id. at 361. 
312. Id. 
313. Id.  See supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text (explaining the Wolfish balancing 
approach). 
314. Id. 
315. Id. at 361. 
316. Id. 
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almost completely open, making any weapons immediately apparent.”317  
There was no possibility that Amaechi would destroy or conceal evidence 
relating to the noise misdemeanor, and “the invasiveness of Amaechi’s 
search far outweighed any potential justification for the scope, manner, and 
place under which it was conducted.”318  Consequently, the court found the 
alleged search unreasonable and unconstitutional.319  Examining the ques-
tion of “whether Amaechi’s right to be free from this sexually invasive 
search” was clearly established, the court concluded that it was.320  It 
observed that it previously “recognized the fact, first established in Bell, 
that the intrusive, highly degrading nature of a strip search demands a 
reason for conducting such a search that counterbalances the invasion of 
personal rights,”321 adding that “[i]t is not a new rule of law that searches 
involving the public exposure, touching, and penetration of an arrestee’s 
genitalia are subject to limitations under the Fourth Amendment.”322 
The Eighth Circuit has joined those which have afforded relief to an 
arrestee who has been strip searched without a sufficient individualized 
factual basis, without judicial discussion of the Fourth Amendment’s 
preference for warrants.  In Jones v. Edwards,323 the court concluded that 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 plaintiff Marlin Jones’s motion for a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict should have been granted.324  Jones had been arrested 
for refusing to sign a summons and complaint concerning a leash law 
violation.325  At the time of his early morning arrest at the door of his home, 
he became “vulgar and abusive” to the arresting officers and was 
accompanied upstairs “for ‘security reasons’ while he dressed and went to 
the bathroom.”326  Jones continued his verbal abuse on the way to the jail 
and during booking, and “[w]itnesses agreed that although Jones was angry, 
he made no attempt to abuse any officer physically.”327  According to his 
allegations, Jones was strip searched “[a]s a final step in the booking 
 
317. Id. at 362. 
318. Id. 
319. Id. 
320. Id. at 362-65. 
321. Id. at 364.  See also Logan v. Shealy, 660 F.2d 1007, 1013 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 
sub nom. Clements v. Logan, 455 U.S. 942 (1982). 
322. Amaechi, 237 F.3d at 364. 
323. Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739 (8th Cir. 1985). 
324. Id. at 741-42. 
325. Id. at 740.  When an animal control officer observed Jones’s unleashed dog and 
recognized it from earlier violations, Jones allegedly refused to sign the complaint, verbally 
abused the control officer and a police officer, and “slammed the door . . . after threatening them 
with suit.”  Id. 
326. Id. 
327. Id. 
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procedure.”328  Then, while nude, he was required to display his anal and 
genital areas to a jail official in an alcove of the hallway.329  He was then 
allowed to dress and wait in a minimum security cell until a friend posted 
bail.330 
Applying the balancing approach of Bell v. Wolfish, the court found the 
district court’s denial of Jones’s motion to have been in error.331  It noted 
that Jones’s offense was “hardly the sort of crime to inspire officers with 
the fear of introducing weapons or contraband into the holding cell” and 
that the officers “had no other reason to suspect Jones was harboring these 
items.”332  The police had been with him “every moment after they read 
him the warrant . . . thereby eliminating any chance that he might have 
secreted a weapon on his person.”333  While Jones had been uncooperative, 
he was not charged with any offense “which might justify a more intrusive 
search,”334 and the court observed that “neither the officers nor the jailers 
attempted a less intrusive pat-down search, which would have detected the 
proscribed items they sought without infringing Jones’s constitutional 
protections.”335  As to the magnitude of the invasion of Jones’s rights, the 
court found it to be “broad” in scope: 
Jones was nude and forced to display himself to the visual 
inspection of a stranger.  Although the manner in which the search 
was conducted was not brutal, it was intrusive, depersonalizing, 
and distasteful for Jones to be peremptorily subjected to this kind 
of search by a stranger in the alcove of the hallway.  Finally, 
although the location of the search did not expose Jones to the 
scrutiny of other jailers or passersby, this degree of privacy seems 
to have been entirely fortuitous.336 
The court also stated that security concerns cannot justify the “blanket 
deprivation of rights of the kind incurred here.”337 
 
328. Id. 
329. Id. 
330. Id. 
331. Id. at 741. 
332. Id. 
333. Id. 
334. Id. at 741-42. 
335. Id. at 742. 
336. Id. 
337. Id.  It also found that, as “the [F]ourth [A]mendment’s protection against the kind of 
search of which Jones complains was well-established at the time his search took place[,]” 
defendants were not protected by qualified immunity.  Id. at 742 n.4.  The court declined to allow 
an award of punitive damages, since it found “no suggestion of evil motive or intent nor of 
reckless or callous indifferences” to federally protected rights.  Id. at 742. 
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There can be little doubt that those circuits which have employed a 
requirement of particularized and reasonable suspicion in their standard for 
assessing the legality of a strip search incident to arrest have done so with 
the view that they have augmented the rigor of Robinson’s approach.  The 
methodology of the reasoning in these opinions has been similar.  As the 
intrusiveness of a search extends beyond that which was contemplated in 
Robinson, constitutional reasonableness requires more in the way of facts 
bearing upon the existence of concealed evidence or weapons.  Robinson’s 
celebrated “bright line” approach (its green light to search triggered by the 
fact of a lawful arrest alone) has been viewed as insufficient to protect the 
universally acknowledged interests in privacy, bodily integrity and personal 
dignity, which are implicated when strip searches are undertaken.  The 
heightening of the necessary factual predicate for these warrantless searches 
has been regarded as the appropriate judicial response. 
III. A CONTRARY VIEW: THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S APPROACH 
One circuit, however, has found this trend to be insufficient in meeting 
the demands of the Fourth Amendment.  The Ninth Circuit called into ques-
tion a basic assumption of the foregoing cases, doubting that the permissi-
bility of a visual body cavity search incident to arrest may be adequately 
addressed without reference to the warrant process.  The matter was raised 
in 1991 in Fuller v. M.G. Jewelry.338 
In Fuller, Annise Fuller and her daughter Roshaun brought a 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983 action seeking damages for their arrests and alleged subsequent strip 
searches following the disappearance of a ring from the M.G. Jewelry 
store.339  Their allegations were as follows: In February 1987, plaintiffs and 
a friend had examined the ring at the store, and after their departure a store 
employee noticed it was missing and believed that they had taken the 
ring.340  The Fullers had left the store, continued shopping and returned to 
the area to eat.341  The employee approached them outside of the store, an 
altercation occurred, and a police investigation resulted in the arrest of the 
Fullers for grand theft.342  During the officers’ investigation, the women 
and their companion were patted down, a restaurant and a restroom Annise 
 
338. 950 F.2d 1437 (9th Cir. 1991). 
339. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1439-40. 
340. Id. at 1439. 
341. Id. 
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had entered were thoroughly searched, and witnesses were interviewed.343  
The officers did not find a ring.344 
After the Fullers were transported to the Los Angeles Police Depart-
ment (LAPD) central station, they were allegedly subjected to a strip search 
by female Officer Barham.345  Plaintiffs stated that Officer Barham took 
each into a bathroom, had her undress, searched her clothing, and visually 
inspected her vagina and rectum.346  Roshaun Fuller also stated, contrary to 
the officer’s testimony, that she was required to remove a sanitary napkin 
for inspection.347  A toilet was inspected after Roshaun had used it, and 
Annise was taken to a hospital for an x-ray.  No stolen item, drug or contra-
band was discovered.348  A police department policy had then required strip 
and body cavity searches of all felony arrestees, and that blanket policy was 
subsequently invalidated by the Ninth Circuit before its opinion in 
Fuller.349  A second strip search of the Fullers was also allegedly conducted 
at the women’s jail where they were booked, but as a result of a settlement 
the legality of that search did not arise as an issue before the Fuller court.350 
Fuller filed a civil rights action against the city, the county, the store, 
its employee, and the police officers, challenging the legality of both the 
arrests and the strip searches under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments.351  Before trial, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the action on the merits.352  The court 
found that the officers “had reasonable cause to arrest plaintiffs” and 
“reasonable cause or suspicion to justify a full body cavity search incident 
to arrest and booking.”353  The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district 
court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on the 
issue of the warrantless arrest.354  The officers adequately investigated the 
 
343. Id. 
344. Id. at 1439-40. 
345. Id. at 1440. 
346. Id. 
347. Id. at 1440 n.1. 
348. Id. at 1440. 
349. Id.  See Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702, 705 (9th Cir. 1989) (as amended) 
(involving the city of Los Angeles’s blanket policy for body cavity searches of arrestees). 
350. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1440 n.3. 
351. Id. at 1440. 
352. Id. 
353. Id. at 1440.  The district court also found that, even if the search had been illegal, the 
officers were entitled to qualified immunity because its illegality was not clearly established at the 
time.  Id.  It added that the city had incurred no liability because the Fullers’ rights had not been 
violated.  Id. at 1440-41.  The action against the private party defendants were dismissed.  Id. at 
1441. 
354. Id. at 1442. 
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allegations at the scene, and could have reasonably believed that there was 
probable cause to arrest the Fullers.355 
With regard to the alleged strip searches, defendants argued “that the 
searches were legal because they were conducted pursuant to a lawful 
arrest, and were justified by the officer’s individualized suspicion that the 
Fullers were harboring contraband—that is, a stolen ring.”356  The court 
recognized that this asserted justification was quite independent of the need 
for institutional jail security involved in Bell v. Wolfish and its own earlier 
examination of the LAPD’s blanket strip search policy.357  In detail, it pro-
ceeded to examine the implications of the defendants’ proffered justifica-
tions for the alleged warrantless strip searches incident to arrest. 
The court stated at the outset that “[t]he intrusiveness of a body cavity 
search cannot be overstated.”358  It noted that it had previously charac-
terized such searches as “dehumanizing and humiliating”359 and recalled 
Justice Marshall’s view, dissenting in Bell v. Wolfish, that “visual body 
cavity searches ‘represent one of the most grievous offenses against per-
sonal dignity and common decency.’”360  The court separately considered 
two justifications which it viewed as offerings by the defendants to sustain 
the reasonableness of the alleged searches.  As characterized by the court, 
the first asserted justification was “that the inspection was authorized as a 
search incident to arrest.”361  A second and seemingly distinct proposed 
justification was “that the search was justified by the officer’s ‘individual 
suspicion’ that the arrestees were hiding the missing ring in a body 
cavity.”362 
Turning to the language of Robinson in which the Supreme Court 
noted that “the scope of a search incident to arrest includes a ‘full search of 
the person,’”363 the court addressed the defendants’ argument that, under 
that policy, “the body cavity search of the Fullers, conducted pursuant to 
lawful arrest to discover a missing ring, amounted to a ‘full search’ that was 
both reasonable and lawful.”364  The court had earlier “rejected this very 
 
355. Id. at 1444-45. 
356. Id. at 1445. 
357. Id. at 1445-46.  See Kennedy v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 901 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1989) (as 
amended) (discussing the constitutionality of the city of Los Angeles’ blanket policy). 
358. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1445 (quoting Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 711). 
359. Id. (quoting Kennedy, 901 F.2d at 711). 
360. Id. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 576-77 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)). 
361. Id. at 1446 (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973)). 
362. Id. 
363. Id. (quoting Robinson, 414 U.S. at 218). 
364. Id. 
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argument”365 in Giles v. Ackerman,366 holding in that case—involving a 
misdemeanor arrest—“that the ‘full search’ authorized by Robinson was 
limited to a pat-down and an examination of the arrestee’s pockets, and did 
not extend to ‘a strip search or bodily intrusion.’”367  The court observed in 
Fuller that the distinction between a misdemeanor and a felony arrest was 
inconsequential368 and that Robinson “simply did not authorize the kind of 
search at issue in this case.”369 
With regard to a strip and visual body cavity search based upon the 
existence of reasonable suspicion, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that it had 
acknowledged its appropriateness only in the context of the institutional 
security concerns of a jail environment.  In the case before it, 
[a]ppellees never contended that the search of the Fullers was 
necessary to maintain jail security. . . .  Instead, Appellees main-
tain that Officer Barham conducted the body cavity searches “in 
order to discover and seize the fruits or evidence of crime”— that 
is, the missing ring.  Appellees have offered no evidence that the 
ring itself posed any threat to the safety of other detainees, or to 
the security of the jail. 
Moreover, there is no evidence that the Fullers were ever even 
incarcerated with the general jail population while being detained 
at the LAPD central station.370 
As a result, the rationales of both Bell v. Wolfish and Ninth Circuit 
precedents were inapplicable to the case, and the court declined “to extend 
the reasonable suspicion standard to body cavity searches for ordinary 
stolen property.”371 
The court found that such an extension would contravene “basic 
[F]ourth [A]mendment principles.”372  The court cited Schmerber v. 
California,373 in which, at the direction of the police, a blood sample had 
been drawn by a physician over the objection of the donor, who had been 
arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor.374  The 
Supreme Court there held that requiring the arrestee to submit to the 
 
365. Id. 
366. 746 F.2d 614 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). 
367. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1446 (quoting Giles, 746 F.2d at 616). 
368. Id. 
369. Id. (citing Mary Beth G. v. City of Chicago, 723 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1983)). 
370. Id. at 1447-48 (internal citations omitted). 
371. Id. at 1448. 
372. Id. 
373. 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 
374. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758. 
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extraction did not violate the Fourth Amendment, since the process was 
predicated on probable cause and “the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, 
under the circumstances, threatened the ‘destruction of evidence’”375 
through the body’s elimination of alcohol from the blood.376  In Fuller, the 
Ninth Circuit viewed Schmerber as holding that, under those circumstances, 
“in order for the police to draw blood . . . there must be, at the least, 
probable cause to believe that the blood test will reveal the presence of 
alcohol.”377  Observing that both Schmerber and the Fullers were lawfully 
in custody when the searches were conducted, the court continued: 
In our view, Schmerber governs all searches that invade the 
interior of the body whether by a needle that punctures the skin or 
a visual intrusion into a body cavity.  “The interests in human dig-
nity and privacy” invaded when a public official peers inside a 
person’s body cavity are at least as great as those invaded by a 
needle piercing the skin.  Therefore, a body cavity inspection can-
not be justified by a lesser standard than that applied in Schmerber 
for a blood test.378 
The court acknowledged that in 1975 the First Circuit had held in United 
States v. Klein379 that the body cavity search of an arrestee accused of 
cocaine distribution “was not governed by Schmerber because there was 
‘no piercing or probing of Klein’s skin, nor forced entry beyond the surface 
of his body.’”380  It nevertheless declined to restrict Schmerber “to cases in 
which the skin is pierced or entry is forced.”381 
The court then added that Schmerber had made it clear that, had it not 
been for the exigent circumstance of the arrestee’s natural elimination of 
blood alcohol, a warrant would have been required.382  The court concluded 
in Fuller that a warrant was necessary before the initiation of a body cavity 
search.383  Based upon the allegations before it, it stated that no exigent 
circumstances existed for the failure of the police to seek a warrant.384  
“There was no risk that the ring, if hidden in a body cavity, would have 
been discarded or destroyed[,]” for the custodial setting easily permitted the 
 
375. Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 
376. Id. at 770-71. 
377. Fuller, 950 F.2d at 1448. 
378. Id. at 1449. 
379. 522 F.2d 296 (1st Cir. 1975). 
380. Fuller, 950 F.2d 1449 n.11 (quoting Klein, 522 F.2d at 300). 
381. Id. 
382. Id. at 1449-50. 
383. Id. at 1450, 1452. 
384. Id. at 1450. 
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police to keep the Fullers under observation while a warrant was sought.385  
The ring was also unlikely to present a health problem to a person secreting 
it within her body.386  As the failure to obtain the warrant was unexcused, 
the alleged body cavity searches were unconstitutional.387 
It is, of course, clear that Fuller discusses only those searches which 
visually intrude into the body, leaving unaddressed the issue of strip 
searches which solely involve the examination of the body’s outer surfaces.  
Nevertheless, the court’s insistence upon the involvement of a magistrate is 
a striking contrast to the prevalent trend among the circuits. 
IV. A PERSPECTIVE 
To the extent that the courts of appeal have been sound in their 
conclusion that the intrusiveness of a strip search incident to arrest extends 
beyond that which was contemplated and authorized in Robinson, the 
Fourth Amendment’s preference for the use of warrants requires that such 
searches be separately evaluated as potential exceptions to the warrant 
requirement.  Such discussion, conspicuously absent from current 
discourse,388 must necessarily include an examination of the role that a 
 
385. Id. 
386. Id. 
387. Id.  The court found that the district court was correct in finding that Officer Barham 
was entitled to qualified immunity with respect to the searches, since it did “not believe that a 
reasonable police officer would have necessarily understood at the time . . . that the searches 
violated the Fullers’ Fourth Amendment rights.”  Id. at 1451.  With regard to the city’s liability, it 
remanded the case for a determination of whether the searches were conducted in accordance with 
LAPD policy.  Id. at 1452. 
 In Fuller, the court noted that similar constitutional standards had been imposed by the 
Supreme Courts of Hawaii and Louisiana.  Id. at 1450 n.12.  See, e.g., State v. Clark, 654 P.2d 
355, 359-62 (Haw. 1982) (determining that the warrantless physical vaginal search violated both 
state and federal constitutions); State v. Fontenot, 383 So. 2d 365, 367-68 (La. 1980) (finding a 
warrrantless physical vaginal search violated Fourth Amendment).  Since Fuller, the New York 
Court of Appeals has reached a similar conclusion.  See People v. More, 764 N.E.2d 967, 969-70 
(N.Y. 2002) (indicating that a warrantless visual rectal search and removal of item violated Fourth 
Amendment).  See also Commonwealth v. Gilmore, 498 S.E.2d 464, 467-71 (Va. 1998) (holding 
that a physical vaginal search violated Fourth Amendment). 
388. The suggestion that the warrant requirement may be applicable to strip searches is not a 
new one.  In 1980, addressing both the broad issue and developments in Illinois which later 
culminated in Mary Beth G., Paul R. Shuldiner argued that warrants are required under the Fourth 
Amendment and that state legislatures should also address the matter.  See Paul R. Shuldiner, 
Visual Rape: A Look at the Dubious Legality of Strip Searches, 13 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 273, 
276-280, 304-07 (1980).  In 1975, the Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure contemplated 
the use of the warrant process for body cavity searches in the following language: 
Search of Body Cavities.  Search of an arrested individual’s blood stream, body 
cavities, and subcutaneous tissues may be conducted as incidental to an arrest only if 
there is a strong probability that it will disclose things subject to seizure and related to 
the offense for which the individual was arrested, and if it reasonably appears that the 
delay consequent upon procurement of a search warrant would probably result in the 
disappearance or destruction of the objects of the search, and that the search is 
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magistrate might be expected to play in this sensitive area of the law, the 
circumstances which have had a bearing upon whether the Supreme Court 
has been prepared to forego the use of a warrant, and the consequences of 
the exceedingly troublesome privacy implications of the strip searches 
themselves. 
The Supreme Court’s “longstanding understanding of the relationship 
between the two Clauses of the Fourth Amendment,”389 has reflected itself 
in the principle that “searches conducted outside the judicial process, 
without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment—subject to only a few specifically estab-
lished and well delineated exceptions.”390  While those exceptions are argu-
ably more than the “few” contemplated by the Court when this description 
of the warrant requirement was reiterated in Thompson v. Louisiana,391 this 
characterization of Fourth Amendment methodology remains sound.  
Exceptions to the warrant requirement must be both “‘specifically estab-
lished’” and “‘well delineated.’”392  Moreover, in the instant context, the 
benefits of the constitutional requirement that an impartial judicial deter-
mination be interposed between the police and the subject of a search are 
especially strong. 
The Supreme Court’s emphasis upon the warrant requirement’s goals 
of judicial objectivity and deliberative decision-making has been repeatedly 
reaffirmed.393  “The right of the people to be secure in their persons” is the 
 
otherwise reasonable under the circumstances of the case, including the seriousness of 
the offense and the nature of the physical invasion of the individual’s person. 
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 230.3(2) (emphasis added).  A search of “the 
surface of [an arrestee’s] body” was authorized without regard to these factors.  Id. § 230.3(1). 
 Other commentators have generally focused instead upon the desirability of adopting 
particularizing standards for warrantless strip searches.  See Gabriel M. Helmer, Note, Strip 
Search and the Felony Detainee: A Case for Reasonable Suspicion, 81 B.U. L. REV. 239, 240 
(2001); William J. Simonitsch, Comment, Visual Body Cavity Searches Incident to Arrest: 
Validity Under the Fourth Amendment, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 665, 687-88 (2000) (arguing for a 
standard of probable cause). 
389. Thompson v. Louisiana, 469 U.S. 17, 20 (1984). The Fourth Amendment states: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
390. Thompson, 469 U.S. at 19-20 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 
(1967)). 
391. 469 U.S. 17 (1984).  Justice Scalia has stated that, in his view, by 1985 “the ‘warrant 
requirement’ had become so riddled with exceptions that it was basically unrecognizable.”  
California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 582 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
392. Thompson, 469 U.S. at 410. 
393. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 622 (1989) (“A 
warrant . . . provides the detached scrutiny of a neutral magistrate, and thus ensures an objective 
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first enumerated concern of the Amendment.  In the context of a search of 
the person, the value of objectivity is reinforced in several ways.  As with 
all searches, the judicial role involves review of the sufficiency of the facts 
to determine if an intrusion is justified by probable cause.  With regard to a 
search of the person, the confrontational elements inherent in a face-to-face 
encounter between a potential search subject and the police are absent.  In 
connection with an arrest, at an early date the Court expressed reservations 
about the judgment of “officers while acting under the excitement that 
attends the capture of persons accused of crime.”394  Removed from this 
process, the magistrate is in a position to gauge the basis for the search, and 
the issuance of a warrant would convey an assurance to the subject of a 
strip search that the intrusive procedure was authorized and is not the 
“random or arbitrary act” of a governmental agent.395  This is, in itself, an 
“essential purpose” of the warrant requirement.396  Allegations and percep-
tions of retributive, racial, or other invidious motivations which can accom-
pany strip searches may thus also be addressed in part by the process.397 
The magistrate’s traditional role in determining the reasonable scope 
and manner of a search would have a tremendous impact in this area.  The 
assertion of the police matron in Swain that she had not been told what to 
look for but had made assumptions about the object of the search398 would 
not have been possible under a valid warrant.  The Fourth Amendment’s 
requirement that searches be reasonable is as undermined by broad policies 
permitting the inspection of all intimate bodily areas, without tailoring the 
search to the items sought, as it has been by blanket policies authorizing the 
initiation of strip searches for all arrestees without regard to particularized 
facts.  Overbroad, clumsy directives simply cannot suffice under the Fourth 
Amendment. 
In addition to the need for an objective determination of the authorized 
scope of a strip search, the value of a judicial determination of the manner 
in which a search may be executed cannot be overstated.  This is a problem 
that asserts itself in search after search, extending well beyond the stark 
 
determination whether an intrusion is justified in any given case.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 
U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (“Any assumption that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinter-
ested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a 
warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the 
discretion of police officers.”); Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 558-59 (2004) (“We are not 
dealing with formalities.”) (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455 (1948)).  
394. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932). 
395. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 621-22. 
396. Id. 
397. A perception of racial discrimination in the administration of strip searches has been 
forcefully expressed in commentary.  See Gibeaut, supra note 5, at 46-47. 
398. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
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allegations presented in Evans to the more common issues of locale, overall 
privacy, officer gender and sanitation.  (One recalls the court’s reference in 
Amaechi to the male officer’s “ungloved hand” which was alleged to have 
been used to penetrate the female arrestee’s genitalia.399  Was this based 
upon its concern for hygiene or the exacerbation of the search’s sexual 
intrusiveness?)  Even if courts may not now be prepared to address the 
question of clinical requirements for the implementation of a strip search as 
a general issue of law,400 it would be most appropriate for a magistrate to 
consider whether a particular contemplated search would be reasonable 
without its execution by trained personnel under specific sanitary condi-
tions.  The judicial imposition of objective clinical requirements may also 
have some ameliorative effect upon an arrestee’s perception of the pro-
cedure’s intrusiveness401 a strong factor in the balancing of interests central 
to a determination of Fourth Amendment reasonableness. 
Beyond a discussion of the benefits of judicial participation in the 
authorization process, it, of course, remains to be seen whether counter-
vailing considerations should permit strip searches to be undertaken without 
a warrant.  An unfortunate consequence of the courts’ examination of 
warrantless strip searches incident to arrest as an adjunct of Robinson’s 
concerns has been an occasional hide-bound focus upon Robinson’s dual 
goals as seemingly inseparable.402  Insofar as a strip search incident to 
arrest should be viewed as a distinct intrusion beyond Robinson’s authori-
zation, each of Robinson’s concerns (the discovery of weapons which may 
be used against an officer and the prevention of the destruction of evidence) 
should be examined separately.  These independent analyses yield con-
trasting results. 
The discovery and neutralization of weapons which may be used 
against the police is so firmly established as an imperative justifying several 
exceptions to the warrant requirement that its importance has virtually 
become a postulate of Fourth Amendment law.  In the absence of an arrest, 
 
399. See supra note 316 and accompanying text. 
400. For a rare holding that visual vaginal searches by nonmedical personnel violated an 
arrestee’s due process rights, see United States ex rel. Guy v. McCauley, 385 F. Supp. 193, 193 
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401. See id. at 199. 
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Terry v. Ohio, Michigan v. Long,403 and their progeny have of course 
entitled police to search expeditiously and incrementally, whether by pat-
down or vehicular sweep, when reasonable inferences from specific, par-
ticularized facts indicate the presence of such a potential threat.  Robinson’s 
conclusion that the threat from weapons is intensified by the more extensive 
contact inherent in an arrest is sound, and the inappropriateness of the 
warrant process in addressing the matter continues to be obvious.  It is 
entirely in accord with these earlier analyses to conclude that, when an 
officer reasonably believes from specific, particularized facts that an arr-
estee has concealed a weapon under his or her clothing or in a body cavity, 
the officer can constitutionally conduct an appropriately tailored warrant-
less strip search.  Such an exception to the warrant requirement comports 
with the reasonable prudence contemplated by the Fourth Amendment.  
Those strip searches incident to arrest which are motivated instead by a 
desire to search for destructible evidence present no parallel concern which 
would excuse a failure to comply with the warrant requirement.  An 
arrestee may be closely monitored while a warrant is sought, and specific 
circumstances which threaten the destruction of evidence or health of the 
arrestee may be addressed as individual exigencies.  Far from being inap-
propriate, the attributes of the warrant process noted above are particularly 
suited to the authorization of evidentiary strip searches. 
Despite the thesaurus of adjectives that has been used to describe the 
invasive qualities and humiliating aspects of strip searches, the fundamental 
question to be faced in determining whether the warrant requirement is ap-
plicable to such searches incident to arrest is simply whether the Fourth 
Amendment can tolerate the courts’ current approach to the basic relation-
ship between the citizen and the police.  The most striking characteristic of 
a strip search is the utter subjugation of individual dignity to the will of an 
individual police officer.  Those analyses which have left the finality of 
these decisions in the hands of the officer have done so neither out of 
necessity nor with due regard to the Constitution’s esteem for the right “to 
be secure” in one’s person.  If the Fourth Amendment’s warrant require-
ment still has any meaningful role to play in its protection, it is surely in 
this area. 
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